Consistency check has been the only criterion for theory evaluation in logic-based approaches to reasoning about actions. This work goes beyond that and contributes to the metatheory of actions by investigating what other properties a good domain description in reasoning about actions should have. We state some metatheoretical postulates concerning this sore spot. When all postulates are satisfied together we have a modular action theory. Besides being easier to understand and more elaboration tolerant in McCarthy's sense, modular theories have interesting properties. We point out the problems that arise when the postulates about modularity are violated and propose algorithmic checks that can help the designer of an action theory to overcome them.
Introduction
In logic-based approaches to knowledge representation, a given domain is described by a set of logical formulas T , which we call a (non-logical) theory. That is also the case for reasoning about actions, where we are interested in theories describing particular actions. We call such theories action theories.
A priori satisfiability is the only criterion that formal logic provides to check the quality of such descriptions. In this work we go beyond that, and argue that we should require more than the mere existence of a model for a given theory.
Our starting point is that in reasoning about actions one usually distinguishes several kinds of logical formulas. Among these are effect axioms, precondition axioms, and domain constraints. In order to distinguish such non-logical axioms from logical axioms, we prefer to speak of effect laws, executability laws, and static laws, respectively. Moreover we single out those effect laws whose effect is ⊥, and call them inexecutability laws.
Given these types of laws, suppose the language is powerful enough to state that action a is inexecutable in contexts where ϕ 1 holds, and executable in contexts where ϕ 2 holds. It follows that there can be no context where ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 holds. Now ¬(ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ) is a static law that does not mention a. It is natural to expect that ¬(ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 ) follows from the static laws alone. By means of examples we show that when this is not the case, then unexpected conclusions might follow from the theory T , even in the case T is consistent.
This motivates postulates requiring that the different laws of an action theory should be arranged modularly, i.e., in separated components, and in such a way that interactions between them are limited and controlled. In essence, we argue that static laws may influence the laws for actions, but the dynamic part of a theory should not influence the non-dynamic one. It will turn out that in all existing accounts allowing for these four kinds of laws [31, 34, 44, 3, 47] , consistent action theories can be written that violate this requirement. We here give algorithms that allow one to check whether an action theory satisfies the postulates we state. With such algorithms, the task of correcting flawed action theories can be made easier.
Although we here use the syntax of propositional dynamic logic (PDL) [15] , all we shall say applies as well to first-order formalisms, in particular to the Situation Calculus [36] . All postulates we are going to present can be stated as well for other frameworks, in particular for action languages such as A, AR [10, 24, 12] and others, and for Situation Calculus based approaches. In [19] we have given a Situation Calculus version of our analysis.
This work is organized as follows: after some background definitions (Sec-tion 2) we state (Section 3) some postulates concerning action descriptions. In Sections 4 and 5, we study the two most important of these postulates, giving algorithmic methods to check whether an action theory satisfies them or not. We then generalize (Section 6) and discuss (Section 7) possible strengthenings of our set of postulates, and show interesting results that their satisfaction gives us (Section 8). Finally, before concluding, we assess related work found in the literature on metatheory of actions (Section 9).
Preliminaries 2.1 Dynamic logic
Here we establish the ontology of dynamic domains. As our base formalism we use PDL. For more details, see [15, 16] .
Let Act = {a 1 , a 2 , . . .} be the set of all atomic action constants of a given domain. Examples of atomic actions are load and shoot. We use a as a variable standing for a particular atomic action. To each atomic action a there is an associated modal operator [a] . Here we suppose that the underlying multimodal logic is independently axiomatized (i.e., the logic is a fusion and there is no interaction between the modal operators [25, 26] ).
Prop = {p 1 , p 2 , . . .} denotes the set of all propositional constants, also called fluents or atoms. Examples of those are loaded and alive. We use p as an atom variable.
We suppose both Act and Prop are finite. We use small Greek letters ϕ, ψ, . . . to denote classical formulas. They are recursively defined in the following way:
Fml is the set of all classical formulas.
Examples of classical formulas are walking → alive and ¬(bachelor ∧ married).
A classical formula is classically consistent if there is at least one valuation in the classical propositional logic that makes it true. Given ϕ ∈ Fml, val(ϕ) denotes the set of all valuations of ϕ. We identify |= with the logical consequence in Classical Propositional Logic |= CPL .
The set of all literals is Lit = Prop ∪ {¬p : p ∈ Prop}. Examples of literals are alive and ¬walking. l will be used as a literal variable. If l = ¬p, then we identify ¬l with p.
A clause χ is a disjunction of literals. We say that a literal l appears in a clause χ, written l ∈ χ, if l is a disjunct of χ.
We denote complex formulas (with modal operators) by capital Greek letters Φ 1 , Φ 2 , . . . They are recursively defined in the following way: For parsimony's sake, whenever there is no confusion we identify a set of
Describing action theories in PDL
Before elaborating a theory, we need to specify what we are about to describe, i.e., what the formulas we state talk about. Following the tradition in the literature, we identify a domain (alias scenario) with the actions we take into account and the fluents they can change. More formally, we have:
Definition 2.5 A domain is a tuple Act, Prop .
An example of a domain is the well-known Yale Shooting Scenario [14] , whose actions are load, wait and shoot, and whose fluents are loaded and alive.
Given a domain, we are interested in theories whose statements describe the behavior of actions on the considered fluents. PDL allows for the representation of such statements, that we here call action laws. We distinguish several types of them. We call effect laws formulas relating an action to its effects. Statements of conditions under which an action cannot be executed are called inexecutability laws. Executability laws in turn stipulate the context where an action is guaranteed to be executable. Finally, static laws are formulas that do not mention actions. They express constraints that must hold in every possible state. These four types of laws are our fundamental entities and we introduce them more formally in the sequel.
Static laws
Frameworks which allow for indirect effects of actions make use of logical formulas that state invariant propositions about the world. Such formulas delimit the set of possible states. They do not refer to actions, and we suppose here that they are expressed as formulas of classical propositional logic.
Definition 2.6 A static law
2 is a formula ϕ ∈ Fml that is classically consistent.
An example of a static law is walking → alive, saying that if a turkey is walking, then it must be alive [44] . Another one is saved ↔ (mbox1 ∨ mbox2), which states that an e-mail message is saved if and only if it is in mailbox 1 or in mailbox 2 or both [4] .
In action languages such as A and AR we would write the statement alive if walking, and in the Situation Calculus it would be the first-order formula ∀s(Holds(walking, s) → Holds(alive, s)).
The set of all static laws of a given domain is denoted by S . At first glance, no requirement concerning consistency of S is made. Of course, we want S to be consistent, otherwise the whole theory is inconsistent. As we are going to see in the sequel, however, consistency of S alone is not enough to guarantee the consistency of a theory.
Effect laws
Logical frameworks for reasoning about actions contain expressions linking actions and their effects. We suppose that such effects might be conditional, and thus get a third component of such laws.
In PDL, the formula [a]ϕ expresses that ϕ is true after every possible execution of a.
Definition 2.7 An effect law
3 for action a is of the form ϕ → [a]ψ, where ϕ, ψ ∈ Fml, with ϕ and ψ both classically consistent.
The consequent ψ is the effect which obtains when action a is executed in a state where the antecedent ϕ holds. An example of an effect law is loaded → [shoot]¬alive, saying that whenever the gun is loaded, after shooting the turkey is dead. Another one is ⊤ → [tease]walking: in every circumstance, the result of teasing is that the turkey starts walking. For parsimony's sake, the latter effect law will be written [tease]walking.
Note that the consistency requirements for ϕ and ψ make sense: if ϕ is inconsistent then the effect law is superfluous; if ψ is inconsistent then we have an inexecutability law, that we consider as a separate entity and which we are about to introduce formally in the sequel.
For the first example above, in action languages one would write the statement shoot causes ¬alive if loaded, and in the Situation Calculus formalism one would write the first-order formula ∀s(Holds(loaded, s) → ¬Holds(alive, do(shoot, s))).
Inexecutability laws
We consider effect laws whose consequent ψ is inconsistent as a particular kind of law which we call inexecutability laws. (Such laws are sometimes called qualifications [35] .) This allows us to avoid mixing things that are conceptually different: for an action a, an effect law mainly associates it with a consequent ψ, while an inexecutability law only associates it with an antecedent ϕ, viz. the context which precludes the execution of a. In AR we would write the statement impossible shoot if ¬hasGun, and in the Situation Calculus our example would be ∀s(¬Holds(hasGun, s) → ¬Poss(shoot, s)).
Executability laws
With only static and effect laws one cannot guarantee that the action shoot can be executed whenever the agent has a gun. We need thus a way to state the conditions under which an action is guaranteed to be executable.
In dynamic logic the dual a ϕ, defined as ¬[a]¬ϕ, can be used to express executability. a ⊤ thus reads "the execution of action a is possible". Definition 2.9 An executability law 4 for action a is of the form ϕ → a ⊤, where ϕ ∈ Fml is classically consistent.
For instance hasGun → shoot ⊤ says that shooting can be executed whenever the agent has a gun, and ⊤ → tease ⊤, also written tease ⊤, establishes that the turkey can always be teased.
In action languages such laws are not represented. In Situation Calculus our example would be stated as ∀s(Holds(hasGun, s) → Poss(shoot, s)). 4 Some approaches (most prominently Reiter's) use biconditionals ϕ ↔ a ⊤, called precondition axioms. This is equivalent to ¬ϕ ↔ [a]⊥, highlighting that they merge information about inexecutability with information about executability. In this work we consider these entities different and keep them separated.
Whereas all the extant approaches in the literature that allow for indirect effects of actions contain static and effect laws, and provide a way for representing inexecutabilities (in the form of implicit qualifications [11, 31, 44] ), the status of executability laws is less consensual. Some authors [43, 7, 34, 44] more or less tacitly consider that executability laws should not be made explicit but rather inferred by the reasoning mechanism. Others [31, 47] have executability laws as first class objects one can reason about.
It seems a matter of debate whether one can always do without executabilities. In principle it seems to be strange to just state information about necessary conditions for action execution (inexecutabilities) without saying anything about its sufficient conditions. This is the reason why we think that we need executability laws. Indeed, in several domains one wants to explicitly state under which conditions a given action is guaranteed to be executable, e.g. that a robot never gets stuck and is always able to execute a move action. And if we have a plan such as load; shoot (load followed by shoot) of which we know that it achieves the goal ¬alive, then we would like to be sure that it is executable in the first place! 5 In any case, allowing for executability laws gives us more flexibility and expressive power.
Action theories
Given a domain Act, Prop , for an action a ∈ Act, we define E a as the set of its effect laws, X a the set of its executability laws, and I a that of its inexecutability laws.
Definition 2.10 An action theory for a is a tuple
In our running scenario example, a theory for the action shoot would be
Given a dynamic domain we define E = a∈Act E a , X = a∈Act X a , and I = a∈Act I a . All these sets are finite, because Act is finite and each of the E a , X a , I a is finite.
Definition 2.11
An action theory T is a tuple of the form S , E , X , I .
For parsimony's sake, whenever there is no confusion we write S , E , X , I |= PDL Φ instead of S ∪ E ∪ X ∪ I |= PDL Φ.
When performing the task of formalizing dynamic domains, we face the frame problem [36] and the ramification problem [9] . In what follows we formally present the logic of actions in which action theories will henceforth be described.
Dynamic logic and the frame problem
As it was already expected, the logical formalism of PDL alone does not solve the frame problem. For instance, if S , E , X , I describes our shooting domain, then
The same can be said about the ramification problem in what concerns the derivation of indirect effects not properly caused by the action under consideration. For example,
Thus, given an action theory S , E , X , I , we need a consequence relation powerful enough to deal with the frame and ramification problems. This means that the deductive power of PDL has to be augmented in order to ensure that the only non-effects of actions that follow from the theory are those that are really relevant. The presence of static constraints makes that this is a delicate task, and starting with [31, 34] , several authors have argued that some notion of causality is needed. We here opt for the dependence based approach presented in [3] , which has been shown in [6] to subsume Reiter's solution to the frame problem [41] , and moreover at least partially accounts for the ramification problem.
In the logical framework developed in [3] , metalogical information, given in the form of a dependence relation, is added to PDL. Definition 2.12 (Dependence relation [3] ) A dependence relation is a binary relation ; ⊆ Act × Lit.
The expression a ; l denotes that the execution of action a may make the literal l true. In our example we have ; = shoot, ¬loaded , shoot, ¬alive , shoot, ¬walking , tease, walking , which means that action shoot may make the literals ¬loaded, ¬alive and ¬walking true, and action tease may make walking true.
Semantically, the dependence-based approach relies on the explanation closure assumption [43] . The reasoning behind its solution to the frame problem consists in a kind of negation as failure: Because load, ¬hasGun / ∈ ;, we have load ; ¬hasGun, i.e., ¬hasGun is never caused by load. Thus, in a context where hasGun is true, after every execution of load, hasGun still remains true. We also have tease ; alive and tease ; ¬alive. The meaning of all these independences is that the frame axioms hasGun → [load]hasGun, ¬alive → [tease]¬alive and alive → [tease]alive hold.
We assume ; is finite.
A dependence relation ; defines a class of possible worlds models M ; .
Definition 2.13 Given a ;-model M = W, R, V , the satisfaction relation is defined as the smallest relation satisfying:
• all the truth conditions of Definition 2.2.
• whenever wR a w ′ then: "what counts as a solution to the frame problem . . . is a systematic procedure for generating, from the effect laws, . . . a parsimonious representation for [all] the frame axioms" [42] .
We comply with that as we can define a semi-automatic procedure for generating the dependence relation from the set of effect laws. Moreover, as it has been argued in [4, 18] , our approach is in line with the state of the art because none of the existing solutions to the frame and the ramification problems can handle domains with both indeterminate and indirect effects.
In the next section we turn to a metatheoretical analysis of action theories and make a step toward formal criteria for theory evaluation. Before that, we need a definition. Definition 2.15 Let S , E , X , I be an action theory and ; its associated dependence relation. Then M = W, R, V is the big (alias maximal/standard) model for S , E , X , I and ; if and only if:
• M is a ;-model;
In the rest of the paper we characterize when an action theory with a dependence relation has a big model.
Postulates
"When does a given action theory have a model?", and, more importantly, "is that model what we really expect from it?" are questions that naturally arise when we talk about action theories. Here we claim that all the approaches that are put forward in the literature are too liberal in the sense that we can have satisfiable action theories that are intuitively incorrect. We argue that something beyond the consistency notion is required in order to help us in answering those questions.
We do not attempt here to provide a 'magical' method for making an action theory intuitive. Instead, what we are going to do in what follows is to provide some guidelines that help detecting unintuitive consequences of a theory and identifying its problematic part(s).
Our central thesis is that the different types of laws define in Section 2.2 should be neatly separated in different modules. Besides that, we want such laws to interfere only in one sense: static laws together with action laws for a may have consequences that do not follow from the action laws for a alone. The other way round, action laws should not allow to infer new static laws, effect laws should not allow to infer inexecutability laws, action laws for a should not allow to infer action laws for a ′ , etc. This means that our logical modules should be designed in such a way that they are as specialized and as little dependent on others as possible.
A first step in this direction has been the proposed division of our entities into the sets S , E , X and I . In order to accomplish our goal, we have to diminish interaction among such modules, rendering them the least interwoven we can. The rest of the section contains postulates expressing this.
The theory of a given action should be logically consistent.
If a classical formula can be inferred from the action theory, then it should be inferable from the set of static laws alone. (Note that on the left we use consequence in M ; , while on the right we use consequence in classical logic: as both S and ϕ are classical, ϕ should be inferable from S in classical logic.)
If an inexecutability law for an action a can be inferred from its action theory, then it should be inferable in PDL from the static laws and the inexecutability laws for a alone. Note that we used |= PDL instead of |= ; because we also suppose that neither frame axioms nor indirect effects should be relevant to derive inexecutability laws. The same remark holds for the postulates that follow.
PX (No implicit executability laws):
If an executability law for a can be inferred from its action theory, then it should already "be" in X a , in the sense that it should also be inferable in PDL from the set of static and executability laws for a alone.
Postulate PC is obvious, for we are interested in consistent theories. It can be shown that PX is a consequence of PS (see Corollary 8.1).
Thus, while PC is obvious and PX can be ensured by PS, things are less obvious for Postulates PS and PI: it turns out that for all approaches in the literature they are easily violated by action theories that allow to express the four kinds of laws. We therefore study each of these postulates in the subsequent sections by means of examples, give algorithms to decide whether they are satisfied, and discuss about what to do in the case the answer is 'no'.
No implicit static laws
While executability laws increases expressive power, they might conflict with inexecutability laws. Consider, for example, the following action theory: How can we find out whether an action theory for a satisfies Postulate PS? Theorem 4.1 S , E , X , I and ; satisfy Postulate PS if and only if the big model for S , E , X , I and ; is a model of S , E , X , I and ;.
Proof: (⇒): Let M = W, R, V be a big model of S , E , X , I and ;, and suppose
i.e., for all ϕ ∈ Fml and all w ∈ W, if |= ϕ for all w ∈ W, then ϕ is true in all valuations of S . Hence S , E , X , I |= ; ϕ implies S |= ϕ, and then S , E , X , I and ; satisfy Postulate PS. (⇐): Let M = W, R, V be a big model of S , E , X , I and ;. Suppose S , E , X , I and ; do not satisfy Postulate PS. Then there must be ϕ ∈ Fml such that S , E , X , I |= ; ϕ and S |= ϕ. This means that there is a valuation v of S that falsifies ϕ. As v ∈ W (because M is a big model) then M is not a model of S , E , X , I and ;.
We shall give an algorithm to find a finite characterization of all 6 implicit static laws of a given action theory S , E a , X a , I a . The idea is as follows: for each executability law ϕ → a ⊤ in the theory, construct from E a , I a and ; a set of inexecutabilities
as an implicit static law. Incrementally repeat this procedure (adding all the ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕ i ) that were caught to S ) until no implicit static law is obtained.
For an example of the execution of the algorithm, consider S 1 , E ∪ {⊤, ¬alive} is satisfiable (⊤ is the antecedent of the executability tease ⊤), we get ¬alive → ⊥, i.e., the implicit static law alive. For this example no other inexecutability for tease can be derived, so the computation stops.
Before presenting the pseudo-code of the algorithm we need some definitions.
Definition 4.1 Let ϕ ∈ Fml and χ a clause. χ is an implicate of ϕ if and only if ϕ |= χ.
In our running example, alive is an implicate of the set of formulas {walking → alive, walking}. • χ is an implicate of ϕ, and
The set of all prime implicates of a formula ϕ is denoted PI (ϕ).
For example, the set of prime implicates of p 1 is just {p 1 }, and that of
In our shooting domain, alive is a prime implicate of {walking → alive, walking}. For more on prime implicates and their properties, see [33] .
The function NewCons ϕ (ψ) computes the new consequences of ϕ w.r.t. ψ: the set of strongest clauses that follow from ϕ ∧ ψ, but do not follow from ϕ alone (cf. e.g. [21] ). It is computed by subtracting the prime implicates of ϕ from those of ϕ ∧ ψ. For example, NewCons
And for our scenario, NewCons walking→alive (walking) = {alive, walking}.
The algorithm below improves the one in [20] by integrating a solution to the frame problem (via the dependence relation ;). As a matter of notation, we define C a = E a ∪ I a as the set of all formulas expressing the direct consequences of an action a, whether they are consistent or not.
Algorithm 4.1 (Finding all implicit static laws induced by a)
input: S , E a , X a , I a and ; output: S imp* , the set of all implicit static laws of
In each step of the algorithm, S ∪ S imp* is the updated set of static laws (the original ones fed with the implicit laws caught up to that point). At the end, S imp* collects all the implicit static laws. Proof: Let C a = E a ∪ I a . First, the set of candidates to be an implicit static law that might be due to a and that are examined in the repeat-loop is
As X a and I a are finite, this set is finite. In each step either the algorithm stops because S imp = ∅, or at least one of the candidates is put into S imp in the outermost for-loop. (This one terminates, because X a , C a and NewCons are finite.) Such a candidate is not going to be put into S imp in future steps, because once added to S ∪ S imp* , it will be in the set of laws S ∪ S imp* of all subsequent executions of the outermost for-loop, falsifying its respective if-test for such a candidate. Hence the repeat-loop is bounded by the number of candidates, and therefore Algorithm 4.1 terminates. This is the key algorithm of the paper. We are aware that it comes with considerable computational costs: first, the number of formulas ϕĈ a and ψĈ a is exponential in the size of C a , and second, the computation of NewCons S (ψĈ a ) might result in exponential growth. While we might expect C a to be reasonably small in practice (because E a and I a are in general small), the size of NewCons S (ψĈ a ) is more difficult to control. Proof: For the left-to-right direction, let ϕ ∈ Fml be such that
ϕ, by monotonicity. By Theorem 4.4-1., S ∪ S imp* , E a , X a , I a has no implicit static law, hence S ∪ S imp* |= ϕ. The right-to-left direction is straightforward by Theorem 4.4-2.
What shall we do once we have discovered an implicit static law? The existence of implicit static laws may indicate too strong executability laws: in Example 4.1, we wrongly assumed that tease is always executable. Thus one way of 'repairing' our theory would be to consider the weaker executability alive → tease ⊤ instead of tease ⊤ in X tease . On the other hand, implicit static laws may also indicate that the inexecutability laws are too strong: We can go further on this reasoning and also argue that the problem may be due to a too strong set of effect laws or even to too strong frame axioms (i.e., a too weak dependence relation). To witness, for Example 4.1, if we replace the law [tease]walking by the weaker alive → [tease]walking, the resulting action theory would satisfy Postulate PS. In the same way, stating the (unintuitive) dependence tease ; alive (which means the frame axiom ¬alive → [tease]¬alive is no longer valid) guarantees satisfaction of PS. (Note, however, that this solution becomes intuitive when alive is replaced by awake.)
To finish, implicit static laws of course may also indicate that the static laws are too weak: Example 4.3 Suppose a computer representation of the line of integers, in which we can be at a strictly positive number, pos, or at a negative one or zero, ¬pos. Let maxInt and minInt, respectively, be the largest and the smallest representable integer number. goLeft is the action of moving to the biggest integer strictly smaller than the one at which we are. Consider the following action theory for this scenario (at i means we are at number i):
with the dependence relation (minInt ≤ i ≤ maxInt):
Applying Algorithm 4.1 to this action theory gives us all the implicit static laws of the form ¬(at i ∧at j ), i = j, i.e., we cannot be at two different numbers at the same time.
To summarize, in order to satisfy Postulate PS, an action theory should contain a complete set of static laws or, alternatively, should not contain too strong action laws. Whereas in the latter example the implicit static laws should be added to S , in the others the implicit static laws are unintuitive and due to an (in)executability law that is too strong and should be weakened. Of course, how intuitive the modified action theory will be depends mainly on the knowledge engineer's choice.
To sum it up, eliminating implicit static laws may require revision of S , E a or ;, or completion of X a and I a . Completing I a is the topic we address in the next section.
No implicit inexecutability laws
Let S 2 = S 1 , E 2 = E 1 and I 2 = ∅ (executabilities do not matter here), and let ; be that for In the literature, such laws are also known as implicit qualifications [11] , and it has been often supposed, in a more or less tacit way, that it is a positive feature of frameworks to leave them implicit and provide mechanisms for inferring them [31, 45] . The other way round, one might argue as well that implicit qualifications indicate that the domain has not been described in an adequate manner: the form of inexecutability laws is simpler than that of effect laws, and it might be reasonably expected that it is easier to exhaustively describe them.
8 Thus, all inexecutabilities of a given action should be explicitly stated, and this is what Postulate PI says.
How can we check whether PI is violated? We can conceive an algorithm to find implicit inexecutability laws of a given action a. The basic idea is as follows: for every combination of effect laws of the form (
. .∧ϕ n is consistent w.r.t. to S , ψ 1 ∧. . .∧ψ n inconsistent w.r.t. S , and S ,
⊥ as an implicit inexecutability law. Our algorithm basically does this, and moreover takes into account dependence information.
For an example of the execution of the algorithm, take S 2 , E 
Nevertheless, to apply Algorithm 5.1 is not enough to guarantee Postulate PI, as illustrated by the following example: It is easy to see that whatever she opts for, the resulting action theory for tease will satisfy Postulate PI (while still satisfying PS).
Example 5.3 (Drinking coffee [19] ) Suppose, for instance, a hypothetical situation in which we reason about the effects of drinking a cup of coffee: , in Example 5.3 we got an inexecutability that is unintuitive (just the presence of sugar and salt in the coffee precludes drinking it). In that case, revision of other parts of the theory should be considered in order to make it intuitive. Anyway, the problem pointed out in the depicted scenario just illustrates that intuition is beyond syntax. The scope of this work relies on the syntactical level. Only the knowledge engineer can judge about how intuitive a formula is.
In what follows we revisit our postulates in order to strengthen them to the case where more than one action is under concern and thus get results that can be applied to whole action theories.
Generalizing the postulates
We have seen the importance that satisfaction of Postulates PC, PS and PI may have in describing the action theory of a particular action a. However, in applications of real interest more than one action is involved, and thus a natural question that could be raised is "can we have similar metatheoretical results for complex action theories"?
In this section we generalize our set of postulates to action theories as a whole, i.e., considering all actions of a domain, and prove some interesting results that follow from that. As we are going to see, some of these results are straightforward, while others must rely on some additional assumptions in order to hold.
A generalization of Postulate PC is quite easy and has no need for justification: PC* (Logical consistency): S , E , X , I |= ;
⊥
The whole action theory should be logically consistent.
Generalizing Postulate PS will give us the following:
If a classical formula can be inferred from the whole action theory, then it should be inferable from the set of static laws alone. We have the following results:
Theorem 6.1 S , E , X , I satisfies PS* if and only if S , E a , X a , I a satisfies PS for all a ∈ Act.
Proof: (⇒): Straightforward. (⇐): Suppose S , E , X , I does not satisfy PS*. Then there is ϕ ∈ Fml such that S , E , X , I |= ; ϕ and S |= ϕ. ϕ is equivalent to ϕ 1 ∧ . . . ∧ ϕ n , with ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n ∈ Fml and such that there is at least one ϕ i such that S |= ϕ i (otherwise S |= ϕ). Because the logic is independently axiomatized, there must be some a ∈ Act such that S , E a , X a , I a |= ; ϕ i . From this and S |= ϕ i it follows that S , E a , X a , I a does not satisfy PS.
Theorem 6.2 If S , E , X , I satisfies PS*, then S , E , X , I satisfies PC* if and only if S , E a , X a , I a satisfies PC for all a ∈ Act.
Proof: Straightforward as the underlying logic is independently axiomatized.
A more general form of Postulate PI can also be stated:
PI* (No implicit inexecutability laws):
If an inexecutability law can be inferred from the whole action theory, then it should be inferable in PDL from the static and inexecutability laws alone. Note that having that S , E a , X a , I a satisfies PI for all a ∈ Act is not enough to S , E , X , I satisfy PI* if there are implicit static laws. To witness, let S = E a 1 = ∅, and For each a ′ ∈ Act, a ′ = a, we define:
where for each a ′ and every world w ∈ W ′ :
Because, by hypothesis, S , E , X , I satisfies PS*, there is no implicit static law, i.e., S is complete in our sense. Then, M ′ is a model of S . We have that M ′ is a model of E , too: for every ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ E and every
′ is a model of X , too: it is a model of X a and for every a ′ = a and all those worlds w ∈ W ′ such that X a ′ (w) = ∅ there is a world accessible by R ′ , viz. some
in this case would preclude X a ′ (w) = ∅, as long as PS* is satisfied). Thus In the next section we make a step toward an attempt of amending our modularity criteria by investigating possible extensions of our set of postulates.
Disturbing modularity
Can we augment our set of postulates to take into account other modules of action theories or even other metatheoretical issues in reasoning about actions? That is the topic we discuss in what follows.
Postulates about effects of actions
It seems to be in line with our postulates to require action theories not to allow for the deduction of new effect laws: if an effect law can be inferred from an action theory (and no inexecutability for the same action in the same context can be derived), then it should be inferable from the set of static and effect laws alone. This means we should have:
But consider the following intuitively correct action theory:
together with the dependence shoot ; ¬alive. It satisfies Postulates PS* and PI*, but does not satisfy PE. Indeed:
So, Postulate PE would not help us to deliver the goods. Another possibility of improving our modularity criteria could be:
This expresses that if we have explicitly stated an effect law for a in some context, then there should be no inexecutability law for the same action in the same context. It is straightforward to design an algorithm which checks whether this postulate is satisfied. We do not investigate this further here, but just observe that the slightly stronger version below leads to unintuitive consequences:
P⊥' (No unattainable effects -strong version):
Indeed, for the above action theory we have
This is certainly too strong. Our example also illustrates that it is sometimes natural to have 'redundancies' or 'overlaps' between E and I . Indeed, as we have pointed out, inexecutability laws are a particular kind of effect laws, and the distinction here made is conventional. The decision of considering them as strictly different entities or not depends mainly on the context. At a representational level we prefer to keep them separated, while in Algorithm 4.1 we have mixed them together in order to compute the consequences of an action.
In what follows we address the problem of completing the set of executability laws of an action theory.
Maximizing executabilities
As we have seen, implicit static laws only show up when there are executability laws. So, a question that naturally raises is "which executability laws can be consistently added to a given action theory?".
A hypothesis usually made in the literature is that of maximization of executabilities: in the absence of a proof that an action is inexecutable in a given context, assume its executability for that context. Such a hypothesis is captured by the following postulate that we investigate in this section:
Such a postulate expresses that if in context ϕ no inexecutability for a can be inferred, then the respective executability should follow in PDL from the executability and static laws. Postulate PX + generally holds in nonmonotonic frameworks, and can be enforced in monotonic approaches such as ours by maximizing X a . We nevertheless would like to point out that maximizing executability is not always intuitive. To witness, suppose we know that if we have the ignition key, the tank is full, . . ., and the battery tension is beyond 10V, then the car (necessarily) will start. Suppose we also know that if the tension is below 8V, then the car will not start. What should we conclude in situations where we know that the tension is 9V? Maximizing executabilities makes us infer that it will start, but such reasoning is not what we want if we would like to be sure that all possible executions lead to the goal.
Exploiting modularity
In this section we present other properties related to consistency and modularity of action theories, emphasizing the main results that we obtain when Postulate PS* is satisfied. 
(We are going to extend M to obtain a model of S , E , X , I and thus show that S , E , X , I |= ; ϕ → [a]ψ.) For each a ′ ∈ Act, a ′ = a, we define:
this case would preclude X a ′ (w) = ∅, as long as PS* is satisfied). Hence
ψ. This means that under PS* we have modularity inside E , too: when deducing the effects of a we need not consider the action laws for other actions. Versions for executability and inexecutability can be stated as well: 
this case would preclude X a ′ (w) = ∅, as long as PS* is satisfied). Hence 
Related work
Pirri and Reiter have investigated the metatheory of the Situation Calculus [38] . In a spirit similar to ours, they use executability laws and effect laws. Contrarily to us, their executability laws are equivalences and are thus at the same time inexecutability laws. As they restrict themselves to domains without ramifications, there are no static laws, i.e., S = ∅. For this setting they give a syntactical condition on effect laws guaranteeing that they do not interact with the executability laws in the sense that they do not entail implicit static laws. Basically, the condition says that when there are effect laws ϕ 1 → [a]ψ and ϕ 2 → [a]¬ψ, then ϕ 1 and ϕ 2 are inconsistent (which essentially amounts to having in their theories a kind of "implicit static law schema" of the form ¬(ϕ 1 ∧ ϕ 2 )).
This then allows them to show that such theories are always consistent. Moreover they thus simplify the entailment problem for this calculus, and show for several problems such as consistency or regression that only some of the modules of an action theory are necessary.
Amir [1] focuses on design and maintainability of action descriptions applying many of the concepts of the object-oriented paradigm in the Situation Calculus. In that work, guidelines for a partitioned representation of a given theory are presented, with which the inference task can also be optimized, as it is restricted to the part of the theory that is really relevant to a given query. This is observed specially when different agents are involved: the design of an agent's theory can be done with no regard to others', and after the integration of multiple agents, queries about an agent's beliefs do not take into account the belief state of other agents.
In the referred work, executabilities are as in [38] and the same condition on effect laws is assumed, which syntactically precludes the existence of implicit static laws.
Despite of using many of the object-oriented paradigm tools and techniques, no mention is made to the concepts of cohesion and coupling [40] , which are closely related to modularity [19] . In the approach presented in [1] , even if modules are highly cohesive, they are not necessarily lowly coupled, due to the dependence between objects in the reasoning phase. We do not investigate this further here, but conjecture that this could be done there by, during the reasoning process defined for that approach, avoiding passing to a module a formula of a type different from those it contains.
The present work generalizes and extends Pirri and Reiter's result to the case where S = ∅ and both these works where the syntactical restriction on effect laws is not made. This gives us more expressive power, as we can reason about inexecutabilities, and a better modularity in the sense that we do not combine formulas that are conceptually different (viz. executabilities and inexecutabilities).
Zhang et al. [46] have also proposed an assessment of what a good action theory should look like. They develop the ideas in the framework of EPDL [47] , an extended version of PDL which allows for propositions as modalities to represent causal connection between literals. We do not present the details of that, but concentrate on the main metatheoretical results.
Zhang et al. propose a normal form for describing action theories, 9 and investigate three levels of consistency. Roughly speaking, an action theory T is uniformly consistent if it is globally consistent (i.e., T |= EPDL ⊥); a formula Φ is T -consistent if T |= EPDL ¬Φ, for T a uniformly consistent theory; T is universally consistent if (in our terms) every logically possible world is accessible. T |= EPDL ϕ implies |= EPDL ϕ.
Furthermore, two assumptions are made to preclude the existence of implicit qualifications. Satisfaction of such assumptions means the action theory under consideration is safe, i.e., it is uniformly consistent. Such a normal form justifies the two assumptions made and on whose validity relies their notion of good action theories.
Given these definitions, they propose algorithms to test the different versions of consistency for an action theory T that is in normal form. This test essentially amounts to checking whether T is safe, i.e., whether T |= EPDL a ⊤, for every action a. Success of this check should mean the action theory under analysis satisfies the consistency requirements.
Nevertheless, this is only a necessary condition: it is not hard to imagine action theories that are uniformly consistent but in which we can still have implicit inexecutabilities that are not caught by their algorithm. Consider for instance a scenario with a lamp that can be turned on and off by a toggle action, and its EPDL representation given by:
The causal statement [on]¬off means that on causes ¬off. Such an action theory satisfies each of the consistency requirements (in particular it is uniformly consistent, as T |= EPDL ⊥). Nevertheless, T is not safe for the static law ¬(on ∧ off) cannot be proved.
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Although they are concerned with the same kind of problems that have been discussed in this paper, they take an overall view of the subject, in the sense that all problems are dealt with together. This means that in their approach no special attention (in our sense) is given to the different components of the action theory, and then every time something is wrong [drop black,white ]black and [drop black,white ]white, where drop black is the action of dropping the coin on a black square (analogously for the others) and drop = drop black ∪ drop white ∪ drop black,white , with "∪" the nondeterministic composition of actions.
10 A possible solution could be to consider the set of static constraints explicitly in the action theory (viz. in the deductive system). For the running example, taking into account the constraint on ↔ ¬off (derived from the causal statements and the EPDL global axioms), we can conclude that T is safe. On the other hand, all the side effects such a modification could have on the whole theory has yet to be analyzed.
with it this is taken as a global problem inherent to the action theory as a whole. Whereas such a "systemic" view of action theories is not necessarily a drawback (we have just seen the strong interaction that exists between the different sets of laws composing an action theory), being modular in our sense allows us to better identify the "problematic" laws and take care of them. Moreover, the advantage of allowing to find the set of laws which must be modified in order to achieve the desired consistency is made evident by the algorithms we have proposed (while their results only allow to decide whether a given theory satisfies some consistency requirement).
Lang et al. [27] address consistency in the causal laws approach [34] , focusing on the computational aspects. They suppose an abstract notion of completion of an action theory solving the frame problem. Given an action theory T a containing logical information about a's direct effects as well as the indirect effects that may follow (expressed in the form of causal laws), the completion of T a roughly speaking is the original theory T a amended of logical axioms stating the persistence of all non-affected (directly nor indirectly) literals. (Note that such a notion of completion is close to the underlying semantics of the dependence relation used throughout the present paper, which essentially amounts to the explanation closure assumption [43] .)
Their executability problem is to check whether action a is executable in all possible initial states (Zhang et al.'s safety property). This amounts to testing whether every possible state w has a successor w ′ reachable by a such that w and w ′ both satisfy the completion of T a . For instance, still considering the lamp scenario, the representation of the action theory for toggle is:
where the first two formulas are conditional effect laws for toggle, and the latter two causal laws in McCain and Turner's sense. We will not dive in the technical details, and just note that the executability check will return "no" for this example as toggle cannot be executed in a state satisfying on ∧ off.
In the mentioned work, the authors are more concerned with the complexity analysis of the problem of doing such a consistency test and no algorithm for performing it is given, however. In spite of the fact their motivation is the same as ours, again what is presented is a kind of "yes-no tool" which can help in doing a metatheoretical analysis of a given action theory, and many of the comments concerning Zhang et al.'s approach could be repeated here.
Another criticism that could be made about both these approaches concerns the assumption of full executability they rely on. We find it too strong to require all actions to be always executable, and to reject as bad an action theory admitting situations where some action cannot be executed at all. As an example, consider the very simple action theory given by S 5 = S 1 , E 5 = {[tease]walking}, X 5 = X 1 and I 5 = I 1 , and consider ;= { tease, walking }. Observe that, with our approach, it suffices to derive the implicit inexecutability law ¬alive → [tease]⊥, change I , and the system will properly run in situations where ¬alive is the case.
On the other hand, if we consider the equivalent representation of such an action theory in the approach of Lang et al., after computing the completion of T tease , if we test its executability, we will get the answer "no", the reason being that tease is not executable in the possible state where ¬alive holds. Such an answer is correct, but note that with only this as guideline we have no idea about where a possible modification in the action theory should be carried on in order to achieve full executability for tease. The same observation holds for Zhang et al.'s proposal.
Just to see how things can be even worse, consider the action theory S A concept similar to that of implicit static laws was firstly addressed, as far as we are concerned, in the realm of regulation consistency with deontic logic [5] . Indeed, the notions of regulation consistency given in the mentioned work and that of modularity presented in [20] and refined here can be proved to be equivalent. The main difference between the mentioned work and the approach in [20] relies on the fact that in [5] some syntactical restrictions on the formulas have to be made in order to make the algorithm to work.
Lifschitz and Ren [30] propose an action description language derived from C+ [13] in which domain descriptions can also be decomposed in modules. Contrarily to our setting, in theirs a module is not a set of formulas for given action a, but rather a description of a subsystem of the theory, i.e., each module describes a set of interrelated fluents and actions. As an example, a module describing Lin's suitcase [31] should contain all causal laws in the sense of C+ that are relevant to the scenario. Actions or fluents having nothing to do, neither directly nor indirectly, with the suitcase should be described in different modules. This feature makes such a decomposition somewhat domain-dependent, while here we have proposed a type-oriented modularization of the formulas, which does not depend on the domain.
In the referred work, modules can be defined in order to specialize other modules. This is done by making the new module to inherit and then specialize other modules' components. This is an important feature when elaborations are involved. In the suitcase example, adding a new action relevant to the suitcase description can be achieved by defining a new module inheriting all properties of the old one and containing the causal laws needed for the new action. Such ideas are interesting from the standpoint of software and knowledge engineer: reusability is an intrinsic property of the framework, and easy scalability promotes elaboration tolerance.
Consistency of a given theory and how to prevent conflicts between modules (independent or inherited) however is not addressed.
In this work we have illustrated by some examples what we can do in order to make a theory intuitive. This involves theory modification. Action theory change has been addressed in the recent literature on revision and update [28, 29, 8] . In [17] we have investigated this issue and shown the importance that modularity has in such a task.
Conclusion
Our contribution is twofold: general, as we presented postulates that apply to all reasoning about actions formalisms; and specific, as we proposed algorithms for a dependence-based solution to the frame problem.
We have defined here the concept of modularity of an action theory and pointed out some of the problems that arise if it is not satisfied. In particular we have argued that the non-dynamic part of action theories could influence but should not be influenced by the dynamic one.
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We have put forward some postulates, and in particular tried to demonstrate that when there are implicit static and inexecutability laws then one 11 It might be objected that it is only by doing experiments that one learns the static laws that govern the universe. But note that this involves learning, whereas here -as always done in the reasoning about actions field -the static laws are known once forever, and do not evolve.
has slipped up in designing the action theory in question. As shown, a possible solution comes into its own with Algorithms 4.1 and 5.1, which can give us some guidelines in correcting an action theory if needed. By means of examples we have seen that there are several alternatives of correction, and choosing the right module to be modified as well as providing the intuitive information that must be supplied is up to the knowledge engineer.
Given the difficulty of exhaustively enumerating all the preconditions under which a given action is executable (and also those under which such an action cannot be executed), it is reasonable to expect that there is always going to be some executability precondition ϕ 1 and some inexecutability precondition ϕ 2 that together lead to a contradiction, forcing, thus, an implicit static law ¬ (ϕ 1 ∧ϕ 2 ) . This is the reason we propose to state some information about both executabilities and inexecutabilities, and then run the algorithms in order to improve the description.
It could be argued that unintuitive consequences in action theories are mainly due to badly written axioms and not to the lack of modularity. True enough, but what we have presented here is the case that making a domain description modular gives us a tool to detect at least some of such problems and correct it. (But note that we do not claim to correct badly written axioms automatically and once for all.) Besides this, having separate entities in the ontology and controlling their interaction help us to localize where the problems are, which can be crucial for real world applications.
In this work we used a version of PDL, but our notions and results can be applied to other frameworks as well. It is worth noting however that for first-order based frameworks the consistency checks of Algorithms 4.1 and 5.1 are undecidable. We can get rid of this by assuming that S , E , X , I is finite and there is no function symbol in the language. In this way, the result of NewCons is finite and the algorithm terminates.
The present paper is also a step toward a solution to the problem of indirect dependences: indeed, if the indirect dependence shoot ; ¬walking is not in ;, then after running Algorithm 5.1 we get an indirect inexecutability (loaded∧walking) → [shoot]⊥, i.e., shoot cannot be executed if loaded∧walking holds. Such an unintuitive inexecutability is not in I and thus indicates the missing indirect dependence.
The general case is nevertheless more complex, and it seems that such indirect dependences cannot be computed automatically in the case of indeterminate effects (cf. the example in [4] ). We are currently investigating this issue.
A different viewpoint of the work we presented here can be found in [19] , where modularity of action theories is assessed from a software engineering perspective. A modularity-based approach for narrative reasoning about actions is given in [23] .
Our postulates do not take into account causality statements linking propositions such as those defined in [31, 34] . This could be a topic for further investigation. • If atm(χ) ⊂ atm( |= ; ¬l j →[a]¬l j ¬l j ), then the premise is false (and the lemma trivially holds).
• If atm(χ) = atm( |= ; ¬l j →[a]¬l j ¬l j ), the lemma holds.
• Proof of Theorem 4.3 (⇒): Suppose S imp* = ∅. Then at the first step of the algorithm there has been some ϕ → a ⊤ ∈ X a and someĈ a ⊆ C a such that S , E a , X a , I a |= ; ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕĈ a ) and S |= ¬(ϕ ∧ ϕĈ a ). Hence S , E a , X a , I a with ; does not satisfy Postulate PS. (⇐): Suppose that S imp* = ∅. Therefore for all ϕ ′ → a ⊤ ∈ X a and for all subsetsĈ a ⊆ C a , we have that ∀χ ∈ NewCons S (ψĈ a ) if S ∪ {ϕ ′ , ϕĈ a , ¬χ} |=⊥, then ∃l i ∈ χ, a ; l i (1)
From (1) 
Now, suppose S |= ϕ for some propositional ϕ. We will build a model M such that M is a ;-model for S , E a , X a , I a that does not satisfy ϕ. Let W be the set of all propositional valuations satisfying S that falsify ϕ. As S |= ϕ, S ∪ {¬ϕ} is satisfiable, hence W must be nonempty. We define the binary relation R a on W such that wR a w ′ if and only if for every ϕ → [a]ψ ∈ C a such that |= 
